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A continuing problem for both American agriculture and our society is the 
shortage of usage water. This problem has become more acute as our population grows 
and as global warming and the demands of agriculture pushes government agencies to 
look for ways to save water. More efficient devices are now required and households 
have been asked to voluntarily restrict water usage. Although less wasteful irrigation 
methods have been introduced, the problem of inadequate water for agriculture has 
continued to grow. 
Interestingly, there is one area where millions of gallons of clean water are 
potentially wasted each year that has been entirely overlooked. There are hundreds of 
thousands of apartments, condos, and housing units in America where the household 
never pays a water bill. In fact, one could view these units as having ‘free’ water. In these 
cases, the occupant may use all the water they want with no penalty for wasting this 
valuable natural resource. This paper has an original model that attempts to estimate 
potential savings if these households received a water bill for their individual water 
usage. 
The authors use log-log model to estimate residential water demand. Data used in 
this analysis contains 8 metropolitan areas (Austin, TX; Boston, MA; Hartford, CT; 
Houston, TX; Las Vegas, NV; Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN; Orlando, FL; San Antonio, 
 TX) and the data were collected from American Housing Survey 2013 Metropolitan 
Data. 
Results show that increasing the marginal price of water decreases water 
consumption by 8%. Since the average water consumption of households that pay a bill is 
10,135.23 gallons per month, if the marginal price increases by $1, then the water 
consumption decreases by 779.2 gallons. Overall, a shift to complete volumetric pricing 
will decrease average household water consumption by 5282.8 gallons per month at 
existing water prices. Results also show measurable differences between cities. The 
marginal price is negatively related to the water consumption levels and positively related 
to the percentage of households with ‘free’ water. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 THE PROBLEM 
Not so many years ago, in fact within the lifetimes of many people living in the 
United States today, clean potable water was viewed as an unlimited natural resource. 
Most people thought nothing of flushing five gallons or more of potable water down the 
toilet and few people complained about creating artificial lakes for recreation purposes or 
pumping water over mountains to irrigate deserts.1 However, the finiteness of high 
quality water is becoming a greater problem in many areas, and policymakers and water 
managers are concerned about ensuring a reliable supply of water for their customers 
while protecting non-consumptive needs such as habitat and environmental quality. 
This paper proposes a method to save one of our most important resources, 
potable water, and does so using a tried and proven technology. It does this without 
harming farmers, without asking plumbing companies to change their products, and 
without requiring a new layer of government. Specifically, we argue that metering water 
use for residential consumers significantly reduces the quantity of water used. We 
develop an analytical model that highlights differences in households that pay a 
volumetric fee for water versus households that pay a flat rate. We use household data to 
estimate the potential reduction in water consumption form a shift to full metering. 
                                                 
1 There are many examples of this wasteful attitude toward water: Growing rice in California, cheap 
electrical power from Hoover Dam and the Tennessee Valley Authority, water sports in Lake Mead, 
bringing water to the Los Angeles Basin, and so on.  In the early twentieth century, too much water was 
sometimes viewed as a threat and the US Corp of Engineers job was to control this overabundance of 
water, for example dredging and straightening the inland waterways.  Toilets with restricted flow rates were 
introduced in 1991, however existing toilet installations that flush five or even ten gallons of water per 
flush are still legal to use in some parts of the United States. 
 
2 
 
 
1.2 CLIMATE CHANGE 
The scarcity of adequate, clean, usable water is well documented and has 
frightening consequences worldwide. Water is essential for all life and used extensively 
for crop irrigation. Water is becoming a scarce resource in much of the U.S. and global 
warming is expected to exacerbate that scarcity via shifts in both water demand and 
supply (Karl, 2009). In the U.S., with surface temperatures rising at an average rate of 
0.14oF per decade since 1901, there are ever increasing demands on limited water 
supplies (EPA, 2014). 
Droughts decrease water supply, draw our national consciousness to water 
conservation, and cause significant economic losses.  From 2012 to 2015, California had 
its most severe drought since the late 1800s and farmers have had to reduce irrigated 
acreage, shift from inexpensive surface water to costly and finite groundwater, and 
change crops to respond to water scarcity (Wallander et al., 2015).   
 
1.3 LACK OF VOLUNTARY CONSERVATION 
Problematically, voluntary water conservation has not been effective to reduce 
demand. State government officials in California proposed a 25 percent mandatory 
statewide reduction in urban water use but they had only achieved a 2.8 percent reduction 
by February 2015 (Nagourney & Fitzsimmons, 2015). Many newspaper reports say that 
homeowners with expensive landscaping would rather pay the fines than let thousands of 
dollars in residential shrubs and ornamental plants die.  
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Additionally, water shortage has become a litigious issue as individual states try 
to get a larger share of the limited water supply. Recently, a lawsuit was brought by 
Kansas against Nebraska over irrigation water use in the Republican River Basin. The 
final settlement requires Nebraska to pay Kansas $5.5 million for estimated damages 
(Knapp, 2015). Lawsuits over water use have occurred in several other interstate basins, 
including the Arkansas River between Colorado and Kansas, the Pecos River between 
New Mexico and Texas, and the Yellowstone River between Montana and Wyoming 
(Schlager & Heikkila, 2009). One community going to court to get limited water 
recourses from another community is at best a ‘quick fix’ for the winning side. This 
might be important for one community, but it is not a long-term solution to fundamental 
and nationwide water problems. 
There is virtually universal agreement that water shortages are important 
worldwide, and in the face of this urgent problem, many US communities are searching 
for ways to increase available water or to increase the efficient use of this scarce 
resource. Not only is water essential to life but water availability and usage are closely 
related to economic growth through what has been called the “energy-water-food nexus,” 
even though water is a local resource (EPA, 2013). Perhaps the first and most critical 
problem for US communities is facing the potential economic losses related to water 
shortage. In California alone, the net water shortage in 2014 is 1.5 million acre-feet and 
the economic cost due to the drought in 2014 was estimated at $2.2 billion and there were 
a total of 17,100 jobs lost (Howitt et al., 2014). 
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1.4 POPULATION GROWTH 
Fifty-one percent of Americans count on ground water for their water usage 
(EPA, 2008) but available groundwater has been facing continual depletion. During the 
period 1900 to 2008, the volume of groundwater stored in US aquifers decreased by 
about 1000 km3. The average depletion rate increased from 8.0 km3/year from 1900 until 
2000, and increased to 23.9 km3/year since then (Konikow, 2015). 
As population grows, more water will be demanded. The U.S. Census’s prediction 
is that total U.S. population growth will increase by 98.1 million between 2014 and 2060. 
The native population is expected to increase by 62 million while the foreign-born 
population is projected to increase by 36 million (Colby & Ortman, 2015). With the 
average person using between 80 to 120 gallons of water at home per day, future 
generations will put additional pressure on the available water resources (USGS, 2016). 
Most people understand that the US must find ways to use water more efficiently or face 
serious consequences from inaction. 
 
1.5 CHANGING IN HOUSING 
There are increasing numbers of households living in rental properties and this is 
the critical problem whose solution is discussed in this paper. In the national summary 
table from 2013 American Housing Survey, 40.2 million households live in rental 
properties and about 73 percent (calculated by author) of them do not pay for their water 
separately. On the other hand, there are 75.7 million households that own the property 
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they live in and there are still about 30 percent that do not pay for their water separately 
(AHS, 2013).2 
For the households that do not pay for water separately, it is incorrect to say that 
they do not pay for water. Generally, they pay a lump-sum payment that includes water in 
their monthly housing payment. Therefore, they do not pay the marginal costs of water 
and the prices do not affect their consumption behavior. Figure 1 is the trend for U.S. 
renter occupied housing unit from 1991 to 2013. Rental occupied households have 
increased from 33.3 million in 1991 to 40.2 million in 2013 which was an increase of 6.9 
million additional units. There was not a large increase from 1991 to 2007, but there was 
a huge increase during the period 2008 to 2013 with 5.2 million added units. This was 
about 75% of the total increase during 1991 to 2013. One explanation for this increase is 
that millions of homeowners were displaced by foreclosures in the nation after 2008 and 
that those homeowners were unable to buy a new home because of lower income during 
the Great Recession (Fernald, 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 For example, many converted properties into townhouses and condo owners do not pay a water bill. 
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Figure 1: U.S. Renter Occupied Housing Unit Trend (in thousand) 
 
Note: Data collected from AHS from 1991 to 2013 
Sources: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1991 to 
2013 American Housing Survey National Summary Table.  Plot by author. 
 
1.6 OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this thesis is to empirically estimate the potential conservation 
benefit of volumetric pricing for water for all households. Implementation of this will 
require meter installation into all apartments and condos, but could potentially have large 
social benefits and provide incentives for conservation. While the economic intuition is 
straightforward, actually measuring the benefit of meters on non-metered households is 
difficult, since consumption measurements do not exist. The analysis in this thesis 
estimates the effect on those units that provide ‘free’ or unmetered water on the quantity 
demanded by each household, and relates this to potential changes in aggregate demand. 
Paying a volumetric fee for water is a cost well known to every homeowner, but is 
unknown to tenants living in ‘free’ water units. Since some community landlords might 
need ‘free’ water to remain competitive in their local communities, ordinances need to 
consider the needs of their communities as new regulations are enacted. When a tenant 
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has ‘free’ water in their rental contract, the tenant is exempt from the obligations known 
by every homeowner: there is no incentive for tenants to save water or to use water 
efficiently since water prices do not affect their behavior or their pocketbook. 
The situation with a zero marginal cost for water is unusual, and, ‘free’ water is 
unlike the normal and ordinary expected daily costs of one’s life. If one is in a high risk 
profession, for example if one is a professional deep sea diver, then one expects to pay 
higher than normal life insurance premiums. A fast and reckless driver with many tickets 
and accidents pays a higher rate for car insurance than a driver with no citations. In other 
areas of life, one expects to pay for what one gets. If a person wants to eat gourmet food, 
then that person must pay a higher price than a person who lives on macaroni and cheese. 
If one wears only designer outfits, then one pays higher than average prices for clothing. 
The same intuition applies to homeowners and renters who pay a volumetric fee 
for water consumption. A homeowner with a water meter who also has a swimming pool 
and has expensive landscaping expects to pay more for water usage and accepts the cost. 
On the other hand, if one lives in a ‘free’ water apartment, one does not need to care 
about economics if the toilet runs night and day. One need not care about water if one 
takes hour long showers. It is a serious waste of resources if there is a leaking faucet, or if 
a person wastes water in any of dozens of possible ways, but there is never an economic 
cost. In fact, one might believe one has a right to waste water because one has contracted 
for a fixed price for a unit with unlimited water. There are no additional costs to the 
household for uneconomic, poor ecologically wasteful behaviors.  This is the problem. 
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section describes previous research that analyzes the difference between 
households with separate water meters with water bills and properties that have water 
included in the monthly payment. There are hundreds of articles about residential water 
demand analysis, but most focus on the demands and supply of single-family homes. 
Only a very few studies are concerned with an analysis of 'free’ water (Goodman, 1999; 
Agthe & Billings, 2002; Wentz et al., 2014; Gordon, 1999; Mayer et al., 2004). Research 
from Goodman and Gordon is now over a decade old and as people have become more 
aware of water scarcity and the increased pressures caused by global warming. It is time 
to take a fresh look at new options for water conservation.  
 
2.1 PRICE ELASTICITY OF WATER DEMAND 
Many papers have estimated residential water demand, specifically focusing on 
the price elasticity of demand. Having an accurate measure of the price elasticity of 
residential water demand is critical for regulators who need to know the impact of price 
changes on the quantity demanded (Olmstead, Hanemann & Stavins, 2005). The price 
elasticity of demand measures the percentage changes in quantity consumed for a one 
percent change in marginal price. For normal economic goods, the price elasticity of 
demand is negative, which means that water consumption decreases when water price 
increases. The larger the absolute value of the price elasticity, the greater the potential to 
use price as a tool to conserve water resources. The literature shows a wide range of 
estimates of the price elasticity for residential water demand. Espey et al. (1997) 
conducted a meta-analysis based on a review of 24 journal articles published between 
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1976 and 1993 and found that increasing block rate areas have significantly more elastic 
demand than others, implying that the pricing structure plays an important role in 
influencing how household respond to price change. 
Research conducted in Tucson, Arizona, found that in apartment complexes, the 
price of water was significantly and negatively connected to the water consumption in 
winter (with coefficient -1923.17 gallon2/$) and in summer (with coefficient -2160.93 
gallon2/$) under linear model3. Also, the age of the apartment building (with coefficient 
34.34 gallon/year in winter and 42.53 gallon/year in summer) was significantly positive 
as related to apartment complex water use (Agthe & Billings, 2002).4 
Not surprisingly, other research has shown that having a water meter increases the 
demand elasticity. Asci and Borisova (2014) find that the price elasticity for residents 
using a communal water meter, where the tenants do not pay for water directly, range 
from 0 (statistically insignificant) in an instrumental variable model to -0.063 and -0.051 
in 2SLS and 3SLS models. On the other hand, the price elasticity of households using a 
separate water meter ranges from -0.24 to -0.31. Other work found that adding meters 
(i.e., “sub metering”) to properties that provide ‘free’ water significantly reduces water 
consumption (11% - 26%) from 5.55 to 17.5 kgal per unit per year or 15.2 to 47.94 
gallons per unit per day (Mayer et al., 2004). A country wide study (Grafton et al., 2009) 
that contain 10 OECD countries (Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Italy, 
Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) found that, on average, households 
that have no volumetric charge consume more water when compared to those who pay 
volumetrically and high-income households are less price elastic than middle and lower 
                                                 
3 Coefficients are converted from cubic meter to gallon. 
4 Coefficients are converted from cubic meter to gallon. 
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income households. In other words, the expected happens: When one pays for water 
separately (via volumetric pricing), then one tends to use less. Table 1 shows a summary 
of the price elasticity of demand estimated in recent literature. 
Table 1: Summary of Price Elasticity of Demand in the Scholarly Literature 
Agthe, D. E., & Billings, R. B. (2002) The price elasticity of demand in the winter 
is -0.45 and -0.73 in the summer in 
apartment complex. 
 
Klaiber et al. (2014) 
Depending on different level of 
consumption, the price elasticity of demand 
ranges from -0.13 to -0.99 in summer and 
range from -0.94 to -1.93 in winter. 
 
Olmstead, Hanemann & Stavins (2005) 
In Discrete/Continuous Choice model, price 
elasticity of demand is -0.3319 for full 
sample and -0.609 for only block-price 
households. 
 
 
Espey et al. (1997) 
In a meta-analysis that based on a review of 
24 journal articles published between 1976 
and 1993 the price elasticity is range from -
0.02 to -3.33 with -0.51 as average and 90% 
of the estimates are falling between 0 and -
0.75. 
Grafton et al. (2009) 
 
The overall price elasticity for 10 OECD 
countries is -0.48 for average price variable. 
 
Mayer et al. (2004) 
With different price, price elasticities 
ranged from -0.12 to -0.65 with an average 
of -0.29 in the straight line model and -
0.275 in the constant elasticity power curve 
model. 
 
Ito (2013) 
The short-run price elasticity with respect to 
average price is -0.127 in summer and -
0.097 in winter while the long-run price 
elasticity is -0.203 in summer and -0.154 in 
winter. 
 
Mieno & Braden (2011)   
The price elasticity is -0.112 in winter and -
0.1982 in summer for an average household 
with income of 62,205. 
Goodman (1999) The price elasticity is -0.72 at the mean 
marginal price of 21.56 per 1000 CF (or 
2.88 per 1000 gallon). 
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2.2 OTHER VARIABLES THAT AFFECT WATER DEMAND 
Other studies have investigated how variables other than the marginal price affect 
water demand. Some of these variables are about information, while others are about the 
rate structure. Borisova and Useche (2013) find that extension workshops that focus on 
residential water conservation effectively reduce water used in irrigation but the effect is 
only temporary. 
Other research has shown that the entire rate structure (not just the marginal price) 
affects water consumption. In empirical studies of residential water demand, the marginal 
price is commonly given as a variable price. In the residential electricity demand analysis 
with increase block rate, Taylor (1975) suggests that if the average and the marginal price 
are positively correlated, an upward bias might occur in the estimation of price elasticity 
if only one is included as an explanatory variable. Nordin (1976) suggests the use of 
difference variables (also referred to as "rate structure premium") that are defined as "a 
lump-sum payment that the customer must pay before being allowed to buy as many units 
as he wants at the marginal price" to correct the upward bias. Because of the similarity 
between residential water demand and residential electricity demand, the difference 
variable is used in our analysis. When households face nonlinear water rate structures, 
they react to the average price instead of the marginal price. Also, when both the 
marginal and average price are included in the estimation of price elasticity, the marginal 
price (also for the expected marginal price) has nearly zero effect on water consumption, 
but the average price has a significant effect on water consumption (Ito, 2013). The 
difference variable is correlated with the average price, since a larger value implies a 
lower average price. 
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Households are also more sensitive to price change in periods of drought and use 
restrictions and landscaping programs that proved effective in reducing water usage 
during a drought (Corral, Fisher, Hatch, 1999). Information on price and consumption 
also affects household water demand. When the bill shows a marginal price, the price 
elasticity increases from -0.36 (without price information) to -0.51 (Gaudin, 2006). 
We can summarize this section as follows: When households receive a water bill, 
then they behave similarly to single-family homeowners and like households behave 
when they receive other utility bills such as electricity. When one receives a bill, then one 
pays extra attention to the costs that created that bill. When one does not receive a bill, 
one is able to disregard utility usage and the actual costs of that utility. Conservation is 
normal when one receives a reminder when that reminder takes the form of a utility bill.  
One would expect nothing less. 
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 THEORETICAL MEDEL 
The total households for residential water can be divided into two groups: 
households that pay water bills (Group 1) and households that do not pay water bills 
(Group 2). We assumed there are 𝑛1 households in Group 1 and 𝑛2 households in Group 
2, thus the total population is 𝑛1 + 𝑛2. Also 𝑄1 and 𝑄2 are representative household 
residential water demand for Group 1 and Group 2 while 𝑄 is the representative 
household demand for total population, and 𝑄 is simply a weighted average of the two 
quantities demand. Therefore, the aggregate demand is: 
(𝑛1 + 𝑛2) ∗ 𝑄 =  𝑛1 ∗ 𝑄1 + 𝑛2 ∗ 𝑄2  ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ (1)  
To normalize population to 1, we divided 𝑛1 + 𝑛2 in both sides and get 
𝑄 =  
𝑛1
𝑛1+𝑛2
∗ 𝑄1 +
𝑛2
𝑛1+𝑛2
∗ 𝑄2  ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ (2)  
where the quantity 
𝑛1
𝑛1+𝑛2
 is the percentage of households that pay for water and 
𝑛2
𝑛1+𝑛2
 is 
the percentage of households that do not pay for water. We use α to represent 
𝑛2
𝑛1+𝑛2
 , thus   
𝑛1
𝑛1+𝑛2
= 1 − 𝛼. 
Therefore, from equation (2) we can get 
𝑄 = (1 − 𝛼) ∗ 𝑄1 + 𝛼 ∗ 𝑄2  ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ (3)  
The demand function for a member of group i (i = 1, 2) is given by 
𝑄𝑖  = 𝑓(𝐼, 𝑀𝑃𝑖 , 𝐷𝑉, 𝐶, 𝐶𝑙)  ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ (4)  
where, MP is the marginal price of last block that household consumed (note that MP2 is 
zero); DV is the difference between what household should pay if all water units were 
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charged at last block marginal price and what the household actually paid; I is the 
household income; C is a vector of household characteristics; and Cl is a vector of 
climate variables. 
 In empirical work, we normally can only observed demand 𝑄1 for households that 
pay for water. We can only predict 𝑄2 from an estimate of how various explanatory 
variables affect 𝑄1 when the marginal price is zero. While the parameter α does not have 
a direct effect on either 𝑄1 or 𝑄2, it will affect the aggregate demand 𝑄, which is a 
weighted average of the two quantities. 
 
3.2 THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
As Olmstead et al. (2005), Mieno & Braden (2011), Ito (2013) do, we use log-log 
model to estimate lnQ1 and the regression equation is: 
ln(𝑄1) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐻 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑂 + 𝛽3𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸 + 𝛽4𝑊𝐴𝑆𝐻 + 𝛽5𝐵𝐴𝑇𝐻𝑆
+ 𝛽6𝐻𝐴𝐿𝐹𝐵 + 𝛽7𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿) + 𝛽8𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐺𝐸) + 𝛽9𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝐸𝑅)
+ 𝛽10𝑙𝑛(𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅) + 𝛽11𝑙𝑛(𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸) + 𝛽12𝑀𝑃 + 𝛽13𝐷𝑉
+ 𝛽14𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦𝑇𝐸𝑀) + 𝛽15𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁) + 𝜀  
Table 2 shows the detail description for each variable in the regression equation. The 
number of full bathrooms (BATHS) and half bathrooms (HALFB) are used in our 
analysis. We expect the coefficients to be positive for both BATHS and HALFB since in 
general, whatever valves were installed in the full baths should be the same as those in 
the half baths. Properties may have been remodel or updated, but this should not affect 
our methodology. It is possible that the number of bathrooms in the property could 
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change behavior. For example, having more bathrooms in a house or apartment could 
encourage residents to use more water, such as by taking longer showers. 
Age of the building (YEAR) could affect water consumption since older buildings 
might be more likely to have fewer water saving features and less water efficient devices 
(faucets, toilets, showers.). Also, the valves in older buildings may not be working 
properly (e.g., leaking faucets, for example, or toilets that continue to fill after flushing). 
We include 4 dummy variables that related to household characteristic. Having a 
working dishwasher (DISH) and washing machine (WASH) are expected to have a 
positive effect on water consumption. Even though households need to clean dishes 
whether they owned dishwasher or not, the dishwasher could potentially use more water 
because the dishwasher will potentially take a longer time to clean dishes.5 
On the other hand, the clothes washing machine has a different impact on water 
consumption. If the household does not have a working washing machine, these people 
would need to wash their clothes somewhere else. This means the water usage on 
washing clothes would not be in these household’s water bills. Instead they would have 
to pay to clean their clothes in another location, for example ‘do it yourself’ laundry or at 
a professional cleaner. Clearly the in-home water use will be higher when there is a 
washing machine in the residence. However, we expect that there is a net increase in 
water consumption relative to home and laundromat use because of the convenience of 
having a washing machine readily available. 
We use METRO dummy variable to indicate whether a household is in downtown 
area. There is different life style between downtown and suburban of a metropolitan area. 
                                                 
5 Generally, dishwashers wash dishes twice whereas hand washing would occur one time only. Also, many 
dishwashers have a ‘one hour’ cycle.  In both cases, mechanical dishwashing uses more water. 
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Dummy variable (TENURE) is used for whether the household owns the house or 
rent the house. We want to estimate whether there is different effect on water usage 
between the house that is rented by the household and that owned by the household. 
The age (HHAGE) of the head of the household, that person’s education level 
(HHGRAD), and the number of persons in the household (PER) are used in our analysis. 
Climate variables are also commonly used on residential water demand analysis 
(Kenney et al., 2008; Klaiber et al., 2014; Asci & Borisova, 2014). In our regression 
analysis, we include average May-September temperature and rainfall the 1984 to 2013. 
We do not include winter climate variables in our analysis since households usually do 
not consume water for outdoor purposes during winter. We did not adjust the relevant 
season for southern climates (e.g., Miami) relative to northern cities (e.g. Boston), though 
the region could affect the relevant season. 
On a problem as complex as this, many other considerations could have been 
included, for example the socioeconomic conditions of the community and variations in 
building codes from one community to another. A region that has a strong ‘green 
conscious’ population, a community that might be more sensitive to natural resource 
issues, might behave differently from a community without this commitment. 
However, we are limited in the data that we have available for the analysis. We do 
believe that the balanced distribution of our sample communities keeps our analysis 
relevant to a large range of cities and conditions. We have Northern, Southern, 
Midwestern, and Eastern communities, we have communities from the largest population 
centers down to communities of under one million people, we have communities that 
have varied sources for their water, and both communities that have current water 
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shortages and communities that have none. The variety of our sample locations is an 
important strength of the analysis. 
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Table 2: Variable Descriptions 
Variables Description Source 
Q Monthly water consumption 
(measured in gallon) 
Calculated using water and 
sewage rate and annual cost 
of water and sewage. 
DISH Dummy Variable: takes 1 if unit 
has working dishwasher and 
takes 0 otherwise 
2013 American Housing 
Survey 
METRO Dummy Variable: takes 1 if unit 
is in primary central city and 
takes 0 otherwise 
2013 American Housing 
Survey 
TENURE Dummy Variable: takes 1 if unit 
owned or being bought by 
someone in the household and 
takes 0 otherwise 
2013 American Housing 
Survey 
WASH Dummy Variable: takes 1 if unit 
has a working washing machine 
and takes 0 otherwise 
2013 American Housing 
Survey 
BATHS Number of full bathrooms 2013 American Housing 
Survey 
HALFB Number of half bathrooms 2013 American Housing 
Survey 
HHAGE Age of householder 2013 American Housing 
Survey 
GRADLEVEL Education level of householder 2013 American Housing 
Survey 
PER Number of persons in household 2013 American Housing 
Survey 
YEAR Age of the building (in AHS: 
Year unit was built) 
2013 American Housing 
Survey 
INCOME  Household income ($) 2013 American Housing 
Survey 
MP Water marginal price ($/1,000 
gallons) 
Water and Sewage Rate 
DV Difference Variable (difference 
between actual cost and paying 
marginal cost for all 
consumption units) 
Calculated by the authors 
MonthlyRAIN Monthly average temperature 
over May to September during 
1984 to 2013 
National Centers for 
Environmental Information 
MonthlyTEM Monthly average Rainfall over 
May to September during 1984 
to 2013 
National Centers for 
Environmental Information 
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3.3 REVISED THEORETICAL MODEL 
For consistency with the log-log empirical model we need to revise the analytical 
model. We have values of ln (𝑄1) from the household survey. We do not have actual 
values of 𝑄2 due to a lack of meters. We calculate values for ln (𝑄2)̂  based on the 
regression coefficients from the ln (𝑄1) demand estimation and characteristics of the 
households in Group 2. Then, 
𝑄 = 𝛼 ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃[ln(𝑄2)̂ ] + (1 –  𝛼) ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃[ln (𝑄1)] ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ (5) 
Set  𝑙𝑛(𝑄1) = 𝑋1 + 𝛽12 ∗ 𝑝 and 𝑙𝑛𝑄2̂ = 𝑋2 
Then we can get 
𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑋1) =
𝑄1
𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝛽12 ∗ 𝑝)
 
and 
𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑋2) =  𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑙𝑛𝑄2)̂ 
where 𝛽12 is the price coefficient of Group 1 demand; 𝑝 is the marginal price; 𝑋1 
and 𝑋2 are the aggregate terms of all other variables except for the marginal price 
variable for 𝑙𝑛 (𝑄1) and  𝑙𝑛𝑄2̂ respectively. Then, we can get  
𝑄 = 𝛼 ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑋2) + (1 –  𝛼) ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑋1 + 𝛽12 ∗ 𝑝) 
= 𝛼 ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑋2) + (1 –  𝛼) ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑋1) ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝛽12 ∗ 𝑝) ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ (6) 
Thus, 
𝑄 − 𝛼 ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑋2)
(1 –  𝛼) ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑋1)
=  𝐸𝑋𝑃( 𝛽12 ∗ 𝑝) ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ (7)  
Thus, 
𝑝 =
ln [
𝑄 − 𝛼 ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑋2)
(1 –  𝛼) ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑋1)
]
𝛽12
⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ (8)  
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where 𝑄( 𝛼 ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑋2), 𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑋2)); α is the percentage of households that do not 
pay their water bill and 𝛼( 0, 1); 𝛽12 is the price coefficient of Group 1 demand. 
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CHAPTER IV: DATA ANALYSIS 
4.1 DATA OVERVIEW 
In this section we discuss the data that we use for the empirical analysis. The 
majority of variables are from the American Housing Survey (AHS) 2013 Metropolitan 
Public Use File micro household data (AHS-PUF, 2013). The American Housing Survey 
is conducted biennially between May and September in odd-numbered years and the 
purpose of the survey is to provide a current and continuous series of data on selected 
housing and demographic characteristics. There are approximately 84,400 housing units 
in the national sample and “Each housing unit in the AHS national sample is weighted 
and represents about 2,000 housing units in the United States” (AHS, 2014). 
Among the metropolitan areas included in the AHS, we selected populations from 
within the top 50 MSA populations, ones that are generally representative of the 
contiguous 48 states. We want the sample to reflect a variety of water demands and 
supply conditions, so we include communities that vary not only in size and location, but 
in the sources they use to get their water. We included communities that use both surface 
water and underground aquifers. 
For a balanced analysis, we also need our sample to come from the various 
geographic and climate conditions of the US. We choose to select neither the largest nor 
the smallest communities in the MSA populations but populations that are representative 
of the whole country. Table 3 lists the metropolitan areas used in our analysis and the 
population of each area. We choose these eight MSA from AHS 2013 Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas.  
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Table 3: 2013 MSA Population 
City Population 
Houston, TX 6,332,710 
Boston, MA 4,698,356 
Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN 3,460,826 
Orlando, FL 2,272,395 
San Antonio, TX 2,283,485 
Las Vegas, NV 2,028,421 
Austin, TX 1,884,439 
Hartford, CT 1,214,949 
                                  Source: US Census (2016)  
Last, it is important to note, the effects of water for agriculture and water 
resources for irrigation are not included in this analysis. The topic is important since 
many state governments need agricultural revenue and managing limited irrigation water 
is the subject of many articles, reports, and books. However, our focus is on residential 
water use, and understanding the factors that affect residential water demand along with 
the potential to use water bills to reduce water consumption. 
 
4.2 CREATING A USABLE DATA SET 
To get the data set we use in our analysis, we process our data in the following 
steps. There are a total 33,559 households from these 8 metropolitan areas in the 2013 
AHS survey. After we process the data (detail in Appendix A), we have 11,509 usable 
households that pay for water for the econometric analysis of water demand. The AHS 
asks about annual expenditures on water and sewage. We use published rate information 
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from each MSA to derive the household water quantity consumed (details on this process 
are in Appendix B). Table 4 shows the sample size of households that pay for water in 
each city. 
Among these 8 MSA are three forms of rate structure: two communities with 
uniform rate structure (Hartford, Minneapolis); three communities with increasing block 
rate structure (Austin (total 5 blocks), Boston (total 6 blocks), Las Vegas (total 4 blocks); 
and one community with decreasing block rate structure (Houston (total 8 blocks with 3 
decreasing blocks and 5 increasing blocks)), Orlando (total 5 blocks), San Antonio (total 
4 blocks). We calculate marginal price and different variable for each household and the 
detail is in Appendix C. The rate structure is in Appendix D. 
 
4.3 DATA ANALYSIS FOR HOUSEHOLDS THAT DO NOT PAY FOR WATER 
There are a total of 18,890 households that answer -6 (Not Applicable) for the 
annual water and sewage cost (AMTW) and we assume these households do not pay 
separate water bills. We infer the quantity of water consumed by each of these 
households based on its actual characteristics and the estimated regression coefficients 
for Group 1. Since the household characteristics provide the link to estimate consumption 
for unmetered households, it is critical that we have accurate information about those 
characteristics. Thus, we exclude households that are missing more than one of the 
explanatory variables included in the demand estimation, or those that report no income 
or negative income. Our final usable dataset has 9,185 households that do not pay for 
water (see in Appendix E). The distribution of these households by MSA is in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Sample Size Distribution 
 Pay Don't Pay 
City Sample Size Sample Size 
San Antonio, TX 2,152 945 
Austin, TX 1,628 916 
Orlando, FL 1,543 1,135 
Houston, TX 1,353 950 
Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN 1,310 1,213 
Las Vegas, NV 1,047 828 
Hartford, CT 1,178 1,777 
Boston, MA 1,298 1,421 
Total 11,509 9,185 
             Source: calculated by the authors 
 
4.4 COMPARISON OF THE HOUSEHOLDS GROUPS 
A naïve analysis may assume that the average water consumption for households 
that do not pay for water would be the same as households with a water bill. In other 
words, if the average household with a meter uses 8000 gallons per month, every new 
household with a meter will also consume 8000 gallons per month. However, this 
assumption relies on the fact that households with and without a water meter are 
comparable to each other. If their characteristics differ, and those characteristics affect 
expected water consumption, any estimate of water consumption with and without a 
meter (and the effect of adding a meter) needs to incorporate those differences. Table 5 
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shows the average values of the explanatory variables for two groups included in the 
analysis and the test statistic that measures if the means are the same between the groups. 
Table 5: Variable Comparisons between Groups 
  Pay Don't Pay  
Variable Mean (µ1) Std. Dev. Mean (µ2) Std. Dev. T-test  (µ1 = µ2 ) 
baths 1.92 0.74 1.50 0.65 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0 
gradlevel 11.53 3.13 10.92 3.22 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0 
halfb 0.40 0.57 0.24 0.51 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0 
hhage 51.85 15.53 48.35 17.90 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0 
per 2.71 1.45 2.28 1.38 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0 
year 38.58 25.49 42.94 26.24 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0 
income 91998.90 95176.16 61874.01 70461.49 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0 
monthlyrain 3.80 1.52 3.93 1.47 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0 
monthlytem 76.30 6.77 74.10 7.11 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0 
q 10135.23 9256.22    
mp 7.78 5.14    
Dummy Variables 
  Pay Don't Pay  
Variable Mean (µ1) Std. Err. Mean (µ2) Std. Err. 
Pr-test 
(prop(1)=prop(2)) 
dish 0.84 0.0034 0.69 0.0048 Pr(|Z| > |z|) = 0.0 
metro 0.30 0.0043 0.33 0.0049 Pr(|Z| > |z|) = 0.0 
tenure 0.83 0.0035 0.38 0.0051 Pr(|Z| > |z|) = 0.0 
wash 0.96 0.0019 0.68 0.0049 Pr(|Z| > |z|) = 0.0 
Source: calculated by the authors 
For simplicity, we named households that pay for water as Group 1 and 
households that do not pay for water as Group 2. All variable means are significant 
different between Group 1 and Group 2 as all p-values are zero in the t-test and the pr-
test. 
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First, the mean of dummy variables (dish, metro, tenure, wash) represent as 
percentage of population that answer 1 in each variable. There are 84% of the population 
in Group 1 that own a working dishwasher (DISH) while only 69% in Group 2. Also, 
96% of the population in Group 1 own a working washing machine (WASH) but only 
68% in Group 2. The differences in DISH and WASH between the groups may be 
partially explained by the large difference in mean income (($91,998 for Group 1 versus 
$61,874 for Group 2). The TENURE variable indicates that 83% of the population in 
Group 1 owned the house they live but only 38% of the population in Group 2. 
Additionally, 30% of the population in Group 1 lived in the primary city center while 
33% in Group 2. There is a larger percentage of the population that lived in rental 
property for Group 2 and normally, there is a larger percentage of the house units are 
rental property in the primary city center. 
The average number of bathrooms and half baths for Group 1 are 1.92 and 0.4 
respectively while 1.5 and 0.24 for Group 2. This may also be due to income differences 
between Group 1 and Group 2. The average education level of the head of household is 
higher for Group 1 (11.53) than Group 2 (10.92) and the average household age in Group 
1 (51.85) is about 4 years older than Group 2 (48.35). Additionally, the average building 
age in Group 2 (42.94) is older than Group 1 (38.58). Finally, differences in the climate 
variables is simply due to the fact that the percentage of households with free water 
varies by city. 
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CHAPTER V: REGRESSION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 REGRESSION RESULT 
The regression result in Table 6 is for estimating lnQ1. The standard error in the 
parenthesis is the heteroskedastic robust standard error. The heteroskedasticity test shows 
that the heteroskedasticity is present in our analysis, thus we adjust this problem by using 
robust standard errors.   
Most of the coefficients in the regression result were expected except for DISH 
and METRO. DISH has negative coefficient and METRO has positive coefficient but 
both are statistically insignificant. This makes sense, because having a working 
dishwasher does not mean that the household will use it all the time and the household 
might wash their dishes even without owning a dishwasher. Also, households living in 
the primary city center should not use more water compared to the households that live 
outside the city since households lived in the primary city center are most likely to live in 
rental units. 
 The coefficient for TENURE is positive and statistically significant which means 
that households would consume more water when they owned the property in which they 
live. Number of bathroom is positive and statistically significant relative to water 
consumption but number of half bathroom is statistically insignificant. 
 The coefficients for variables with log transformed (GRADLEVEL, HHAGE, 
PER, YEAR, INCOME, MONTHLYRAIN, MONTHLYTEM) measure elasticities. 
Education level is statistically insignificant while the coefficient for LN(HHAGE) is 
0.082 and statistically significant. This means that if head of household’s age increases 1 
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percent, then the water consumption will increase 0.082 percent. The coefficient for 
LN(YEAR) shows that if the building age increases 1 percent, then the water 
consumption will increase 0.053 percent. 
 Household size and income are positive and statistically significant related to 
water consumption. A 1 percent increase in household size or income increases water 
consumption by 0.226 and 0.018 percent respectively. 
 In this model, we did not use log transformation on marginal price (MP) and 
different variable (DV) since we want to use the coefficients from Q1 to estimate Q2. As 
we mentioned, the marginal price for Group 2 is zero which means that if we use log 
transformation on marginal price, then LN(MP) will be infinite. Also, under the 
assumption that the demand function is the same for both groups, it would be 
theoretically inconsistent with the analytical framework if we use LN(MP) as explanatory 
variable. This is because by using LN(MP) in the regression means that there is a 
constant elasticity demand, however this is not possible for Group 2 with marginal price 
equal to zero. The coefficient for MP shows that if marginal price of water increase by 1 
dollar, then the water consumption will decrease about 8% when everything else stay the 
same.6 Table 7 shows the reduction in water consumption under different consumption 
levels when the price is increase by 1 dollar. 
 Monthly rainfall is negatively related to water consumption while monthly 
temperature is positively related to water consumption. Households are less responsive to 
                                                 
6 Proof: Assume original marginal price is MP0 and household consume q1 water at this marginal price. 
After the marginal price increase $1, household consume q2 water. Since everything else stay the same, we 
set the sum of other variables calculation as X. Then ln(q1) = X + (-0.08) * MP0 and ln(q2) = X + (-0.08) * 
(MP0+1). We can get ln(q2) + 0.08 = ln(q1) then ln(q2/q1) = -0.08. We then take exponent on both size and 
get q2/q1 = 0.923. 
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monthly rainfall since 1 percent increase in rainfall only reduces water consumption by 
0.031 percent. On the other hand, households are more sensitive to monthly temperature 
since 1 percent increase in temperature will increase water consumption by 1.393 percent. 
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Table 6: Water Demand Regression Results (dependent variable is ln(Q1)) 
Variables   
DISH -0.022 (0.017) 
METRO -0.021* (0.012) 
TENURE 0.083*** (0.016) 
WASH 0.024 (0.029) 
BATHS 0.077*** (0.009) 
LN(GRADLEVEL) 0.014 (0.016) 
HALFB 0.011 (0.011) 
LN(HHAGE) 0.082*** (0.020) 
LN(PER) 0.226*** (0.012) 
LN(YEAR) 0.053*** (0.008) 
LN(INCOME) 0.018** (0.007) 
MP -0.080*** (0.001) 
DV 0.019*** (0.0002) 
LN(MONTHLYRAIN) -0.031*** (0.009) 
LN(MONTHLYTEM) 1.393*** (0.093) 
CONSTANT 1.964*** (0.4442) 
R-squared 0.561 
Prob > F 0.000 
N 11,509 
*, **, *** indicate significance level at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent respectively. 
Figures in parenthesis are heteroskedastic robust standard error. 
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Table 7: Consumption Decrease after a Water Rate Change under Different Initial 
Consumption Level (in gallons) 
Source: calculated by the authors 
 
5.2 ESTIMATION OF Q2 
 We assume that the demand functions Q1 and Q2 are identical and the only 
difference is that the marginal price for Q2 is zero and the difference variable depend on 
marginal price. Thus, the coefficients in Q2 are the same as Q1 and we use these 
coefficients from Q1 to estimate demand function Q2, conditional on the actual household 
characteristics of Group 2. For increasing block rate structures, the different variable 
(DV) acts as income subsidy since the marginal price increases as households consume 
Original 
Consumption Level 
Post Consumption Level 
when Price Increases $1 Decrease in Consumption 
1000 923.1 76.9 
2000 1846.2 153.8 
3000 2769.3 230.7 
4000 3692.5 307.5 
5000 4615.6 384.4 
6000 5538.7 461.3 
7000 6461.8 538.2 
8000 7384.9 615.1 
9000 8308.0 692.0 
10000 9231.2 768.8 
11000 10154.3 845.7 
12000 11077.4 922.6 
13000 12000.5 999.5 
14000 12923.6 1076.4 
15000 13846.7 1153.3 
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more units of water and households had to pay more if all water units are priced at the 
price of last block they consumed. Figure 2 shows an example where an individual pays 
mp1 for the first block, mp2 for the second block, and mp3 for any additional water. The 
DV measure is defined as the red area in for a person that consumes at Q*. Even though 
the marginal price for Group 2 is zero; the inferred DV is not zero for Group 2. 
Figure 2: DV for A Person That Faces Three Increasing Block Water Structures 
 
 
5.3 ESTIMATION OF THE DIFFERENT VARIABLE FOR GROUP 2 
We do not have any information about the different variable (DV) values for 
Group 2 households. In this section, we explain how we use Group 1 households to 
estimate the value of DV for Group 2 households. First, we used the coefficients from the 
Q1 regression to estimate how much water each Group 1 household would consume with 
marginal price and the DVs are equal to zero. We also use the coefficients from the Q1 
regression to estimate how much water each Group 2 household would consume with 
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marginal prices and the DV values are equal to zero. For each Group 2 household in the 
sample, we match the Group 1 household with smallest consumption that is greater than 
or equal to the estimate of the Group 2 household from that MSA. For each matched pair, 
we used the marginal price and the DV values from the Group 1 household to replace the 
marginal price and the DV values for Group 2. This process is done within each city so 
that matches are as similar as possible. 
After all households in Group 2 are matched and replaced with the price variables 
from the households in Group 1, we have complete data for Group 2 households. Using 
the coefficients from the Q1 regression, we estimate that the average monthly water 
consumption for Group 2 households (conditional on Group 2 households having meters 
and paying for water) is 6,118.71 gallons (110.02 gallons per day per person). The 
observed average monthly water consumption for Group 1 households is 10,135.23 
gallons (157.64 gallons per day per person). Thus, the average per person daily water 
consumption for Group 1 households is about 47 gallons more than Group 2 when both 
groups pay water bills. 
 
5.4 REALITY: GROUP 2 HOUSEHOLDS DO NOT PAY WATER BILLS 
In reality, Group 2 households do not pay water bills. This means that the 
marginal price is zero; however, the DV for Group 2 households is not zero (except for 
flat rate cities) because as long as households consume more than first block size, then 
the DV will be positive with increasing block rates. We also know that for households in 
Group 2, the actual DV will be at least as large as the estimate based on paying the water 
bill (the estimation method is described in the previous section). We know households in 
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Group 2 would consume more water when the marginal price is zero which means that 
the value of the DV will be larger. Thus, when Group 2 households do not pay water 
bills, the value of the DV should at least be as large as when they do pay water bills. With 
the marginal price equal to zero and the DV stays the same, the average monthly water 
consumption for Group 2 households is 11,401.51 gallons (199.3 gallons per day per 
person). Therefore, on average, each person in Group 2 will save 89.28 gallons of water 
per day when Group 2 households pay water bills. 
 
 
5.5 Q ESTIMATION 
Last, one of our main objectives is to estimate an aggregate Q, or one that is 
representative of the “average” household. While we assume that the individual 
household demand does not change, the aggregate demand depends on the proportion of 
households that pay for water. For water utilities, this is the most important measure since 
it reflects the expected total consumption and water needs that must be provided. To 
estimate Q, we need to get the value of α. There are 11,509 households in Group 1 and 
9,185 households in Group 2 with total 20,694 households. Thus, α is equal to 44.4% (α 
 9185/20694) and 1 – α is 55.6%. We rewrite equation (3) as 
𝑄 = 0.556 ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑙𝑛(𝑄1)) + 0.444 ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃((ln(𝑄2)̂  )) ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ (9) 
 
5.6 PRICE FUNCTION ESTIMATION 
From the theoretical model, we know the price function is 
𝑝 =
ln [
𝑄 − 𝛼 ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑋2)
(1 –  𝛼) ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑋1)
]
𝛽12
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where 𝑄( 𝛼 ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑋2), 𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑋2)). 
From the empirical demand estimation result, we calculate that EXP(X1) equals 18284.25 
gallons and EXP(X2) equals 11401.51 gallons. Also, 𝛽12 is equal to -0.08 gallon^2/$. 
Then we get the price function as 
𝑝 =
ln [
𝑄 − 𝛼 ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑋2)
(1 –  𝛼) ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑋1)
]
𝛽12
=
ln [
𝑄 − 𝛼 ∗ 11401.51
(1 –  𝛼) ∗ 18284.25)
]
−0.08
⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ (10) 
Figure 3 shows the aggregate demand curve under different values of 𝛼. 
 
Figure 3: Aggregate Demand Curve under Different Values of 𝛼 
 
 
The α is equal to 0.444 from the empirical data. We plug in the value of α and get 
the price function as 
𝑝 =
ln [
𝑄 − 5062.27
10166.04 ]
−0.08
⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ (11) 
where 𝑄( 5062.27, 11401.51). 
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Then we can get  
 
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝑄
=  
1
404.98−0.08∗𝑄
 ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ (12) 
As we can see, as 𝑄 gets larger, the rate of change gets smaller. 
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CHAPTER VI: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this thesis, we use the data from 2013 American Housing Survey Metropolitan 
to estimate the potential water conservation when households pay water bills. There are 
two types of households in our analysis: households that pay water bills (Group 1) and 
households that do not pay water bills (Group 2). We use log-log model to estimate 
Group 1 log-transformation (𝑙𝑛𝑄1) demand and then use 𝑙𝑛𝑄1 coefficient to estimate the 
water consumption level for Group 1 and Group 2 households after we set the marginal 
price and DV equal to zero. We use these consumption levels to match Group 2 
households with Group 1 households under each MSA. For each matched pair, the 
marginal price and DV for Group 2 households were replaced by the Group 1 
household’s marginal price and DV. Then we estimate the consumption level for Group 2 
households when they pay water bills and when they do not pay a water bills. The 
difference in consumption when Group 2 households pay water bills and do not pay water 
bills is the potential water conservation. The numbers show us what one might have 
assumed before beginning the analysis: billing for a utility will cause some people to 
restrict usage. The consumer pays closer attention to usage and monitors waste. 
Our work confirms what Grafton et al. (2009) has found using data from 10 
OECD countries in Asia, Latin American, and Europe. Researchers found that having 
metered water makes consumers more conservative with water usage. 
People realize that shortages of potable water exist today and that shortages will 
only increase in the future. Solutions are critical; however, solutions do exist. For 
example, in September 2015, higher efficiency water heater became mandated by law. 
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Today, toilets flush with under one and one half gallon per flush whereas older toilets 
flushed with three and one half gallons per flush. 
Multifamily living was common as populations moved into the cities, beginning 
over a hundred and fifty years ago, when water was not viewed as a scarce natural 
resource at all. In fact, water was thought of as both a problem and a solution at the same 
time. Water was not scarce, so rice could be grown in deserts; dams could be built for 
electric power and irrigation, and water could even be pumped over the California 
foothills to a desert called the LA basin. No could see the coming problems. 
Next, when there is no direct economic fee for a wasteful behavior when water is 
not billed.  Even people who are concerned about the environment can be wasteful when 
a person does not need to pay. 
It is a reasonable hypothesis that ‘free’ water households are similar to other 
world populations, the same as the ordinary American homeowners, and will tend not to 
behave differently about their water use unless there are mandatory restrictions or if they 
are incentivized to consider conservation because of a change in water rates. As an added 
benefit, remodeling and building contractors will have new work opportunities. There are 
additional billing hours for licensed plumbers and the manufacturers of residential water 
meters will have increased volume. These should be good for a country with eight years 
of a stagnant residential construction market. 
One might assume that objections could come from building owners who fear 
new remodeling costs. This could be a reasonable objection until one considers the 
potential benefits to our country. A review of residential water meters advertised on the 
internet shows prices from about $90 to $160 per unit, depending on the features and the 
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warranty offered. Our model estimates that the average household going from non-
metered to metered water would save on average about 5,000 gallons of water per month. 
With the current average marginal price of water in our Group 1 sample at $7.78 per 
1,000 gallons, the water meter would be paid for in 3 to 4 months, less the cost of 
installation. 
Building owners know and accept that changes in plumbing and electrical codes 
that are required in new construction. Existing units can and should be phased in over a 
span of time. As we have seen in water restrictions in residential toilets and faucets, 
existing buildings are phased in and do not cause an undue burden to owners. Only an 
analysis of construction costs could answer this question and that is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
Last, and perhaps most important, the measure will be popular with people who 
are concerned about the diminishing availability of potable water. This should include 
powerful groups like the National Resources Defense Council and those voters who 
consider themselves part of the ‘green revolution’. Non metered households may worry 
that their utility costs could go up, but our analysis shows that this is usually not the case. 
This is not an unusual proposal. During the early 1990s, the Federal government 
passed a simple law requiring toilets to flush with no more than 1.2 gallons per flush. At 
that time, the average toilet flushed with 3.5 gallons of water with each flush.  Both non 
metered households and single family owned homes were given a discount voucher to 
make the change to efficient toilets. This law saved hundreds of thousands of gallons of 
clean, potable water that were being flushed down inefficient toilets.  Nothing was lost. 
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Just last year, Federal regulations changed for water heaters making them more 
energy efficient. Manufacturers where allowed to sell of their stocks and retailers were 
given a full year to dispose of the older, less efficient models. This process is still going 
on and has not disrupted the availability of water heaters and the major manufacturers 
have been willing partners in the changeover. Residential faucets and showers have gone 
through similar flow restrictions without problems of supply or engineering. Fortunately, 
there is no major industry that could be harmed by this proposal, and like the changes in 
residential flow rates, one could expect this change to mirror water flow rates changes 
and be welcomed. 
This is a democratic proposal. If one wishes to take hour long showers, then 
nothing in this proposal takes that privilege away. The only change is that each person 
must pay their fair share of the costs for their behavior; a very American point of view. 
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APPENDIX A 
PROCESSES TO GET THE USABLE DATA SET 
First, we exclude households that answer in the survey that contain -6 (Not 
applicable) in AMTW. Excluding these in the variables, we have remaining 14,669 
households that can be used and are available for our analysis. 
Second, we exclude 457 households in the METRO section that answer 2 
(households live in the secondary central city) in the METRO question.  We have to 
exclude these households in our analysis because we want to use METRO as dummy 
variable in our analysis because the dummy variable. Similarly, we exclude 382 
households that answer 3 (occupied without payment of rent) in the question about 
TENURE. We are left with 14,212 households. 
Third, we exclude households that report AMTW>INCOME.  This leaves us with 
a total of 13,830 households. 
There is one more set of households excluded. When the final Q (water 
consumption) is negative based on the rates, then the household is excluded in the 
analysis. This is explained below. 
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APPENDIX B 
PROCESSES OF CALCULATE HOUSEHOLDS WATER QUANTITY 
CONSUMED 
First, figure the monthly water and sewage cost by dividing AMTW by 12. 
Denote new monthly water and sewage cost as ME0 (monthly water expenditure). 
Second, if there are monthly fixed (or service) charges, then subtract these 
charges from ME0 otherwise go to step 3. Denote new monthly water and sewage cost as 
ME1. In excel, use ‘IF’ function as if ME1 is positive, then equal to ME1 otherwise 0. 
Denote new ME1 as ME1’. 
Third, use water and sewage rate structure to calculate the total cost needed to 
consume whole block size in each block. For multiple blocks cities, denote the total cost 
as BC(i) (i= 1,2,3,4,…,k is the block number and k is the last block) and denote marginal 
price in each block as MP(i) ($/1000 Gallon). 
Fourth, subtract BC(1) from ME1’ and denote new monthly water and sewage 
cost as ME2. If ME2 is positive, then Q1 is equal to first block size otherwise Q1 is equal 
to ME1’*1000/MP1. Then, use ‘IF’ function as if ME2 is positive, then equal to ME2 
otherwise 0. Denote new ME2 as ME2’. 
Fifth, repeat step 4 for all blocks except the last block. 
Sixth, since the last block don’t have block size, the quantity consumed is equal to 
ME(k)’*1000/MP(k) assuming k is the last block. And for flat rate city, the household 
water quantity consumed is equal to ME1’*1000/P when P is equal to the flat water rate. 
Seventh, final water quantity consumed. Add up all Qi together and get the final 
water consumption quantity Q. 
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Eighth, if the final Q is negative because ME0 is less than the monthly fixed (or 
service) charge, then we excluded these households in our analysis. 
Ninth, we excluded households that use less than 10 gallons per day per person.   
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Appendix C 
PROCESSES TO CALCULATE MARGINAL PRICE AND DIFFERENT 
VARIABLE 
First, copy value only for all blocks water quantity consumed, then change 0 to M 
since the water quantity consumed is 0 for blocks that household do not consume. 
Second, in Microsoft Excel, use ‘COUNT’ function for all blocks, then the 
number shows how many blocks that household consumed and denoted as NB (number 
of blocks). Then, use ‘IF’ function as if NB=i (where i is 1,2,3,4,…,k), then is equal to 
MP(i), otherwise 0. 
Third, for multiple block city, add all MP(i) together to get MP (marginal price) 
that each household paid in the last block they consumed. For flat rate city, MP is equal 
to the flat rate (FR). 
Fourth, the Different Variable is equal to MP*Q/1000 – MC1’ for households that 
face fixed charge and FR*Q/1000 – MC1’ for households that face flat rate. 
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Appendix D 
RATE STRUCTURE 
 
Austin, TX 
Fixed Charge:   
Customer Account Charge Per Month $4.83  
Equivalent Meter Charge Per Month $3.68  
Fire Protection Component Per Month $1.49  
Single-Family Residential Volume Unit Charge: Unit Rate Per 1,000 Gallons 
0 - 2,000 Gallons $1.25  
2,001 - 6,000 Gallons $2.80  
6,001 - 11,000 Gallons $5.60  
11,001 - 20,000 Gallons $9.40  
20,001 - over Gallons $12.25  
Water Revenue Stability Reserve Fund 
Surcharge: Unit Rate Per 1,000 Gallons 
All Volumes $0.12  
Source: 
https://austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/Water/Rates/Approved%20Retail%20Wa
ter%20Service%20Rates%202012-13.pdf 
 
 
 
Boston, MA 
Consumption 
(Cu. Ft./Day) Water Rate Per 1,000 Gallons Sewer Rate Per 1,000 Gallons 
First 19 $5.95  $7.70  
Next 20 $6.23  $7.94  
Next 50 $6.49  $8.10  
Next 260 $6.90  $8.55  
Next 950 $7.20  $9.02  
Over 1299 $7.45  $9.33  
Source: 
http://www.bwsc.org/SERVICES/Rates/RATES_2013
.pdf  
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Hartford, CT 
Custonmer Service Charge $13.48 
Water Use Charge $2.50 per 100 cubic feet 
Sewer User Charge $2.52 per 100 cubic feet 
Source: http://themdc.org/  
             Note: The source in this website is not exist now but we attach the PDF file. 
 
 
 
 
Houston, TX 
Water Rates   
Basic Charge $4.73  
The numbers below this line include both Base and Volume charge 
1,000 gallons $4.86  
2,000 gallons $11.08  
3,000 gallons $11.45  
4,000 gallons $21.66  
5,000 gallons $25.96  
6,000 gallons $30.26  
7,000 to 12,000 
gallons 
The total charge for 6,0000 gallons + $4.67 per 1,000 gallons 
Over 12,000 
gallons 
The total charge for 12,0000 gallons + $7.69 per 1,000 gallons 
Sewer Rates   
Basic Charge $10.05  
The numbers below this line include both Base and Volume charge 
1,000 gallons $10.21  
2,000 gallons $10.54  
3,000 gallons $10.81  
4,000 gallons $24.80  
5,000 gallons $29.85  
6,000 gallons $37.20  
Over 6,000 gallons 
The total charge for 6,0000 gallons + $7.35 per 1,000 gallons 
Source: 
https://edocs.publicworks.houstontx.gov/documents/divisions/resource/ucs/2013_water
_rates.pdf 
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Las Vegas, NV 
Daily Service Charge $0.3863 * 30 days = $11.59 
SNWA Infrastructure Charge $9.59  
SNWA Commodity Charge $0.44 per 1,000 gallons 
SNWA Reliability Surcharge 0.25% of total bill 
Water Rate (Threshold * 1,000 
gallons) Rate per 1,000 gallons 
0-6.8 $1.16  
6.81-13.5 $2.08  
13.51-27 $3.09  
27.01-over $4.58  
Source: https://www.lvvwd.com/custserv/billing_rates_thresholds.html 
 
 
 
 
 
Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN 
Water Fixed Charge $5.25  
Sewer Fixed Charge $6.45  
Water Charges Per Unit $3.29  
Sewer Charge Per Unit $3.14  
Source: http://www.minneapolismn.gov/utilitybilling/utility-
billing_rates 
Note: Water and sewer fixed charges for 2013 were not given in 
this data.  The authors replaced these with 2016 values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Orlando, FL 
Service Charge $7.50 
Fire Protection Rates $9.70 
Volume Charge per 1,000 gallons 
First 3,000 gallons consumed $0.634 
Next 4,000 gallons consumed $1.077 
Next 12,000 gallons consumed $1.589 
Next 11,000 gallons consumed $2.832 
All consumption over 30,000 gallons $5.300 
Source: http://www.ouc.com/residential/service-rates-and-
costs/water-rates 
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San Antonio, TX 
Water Supply Fee Rates   
blocks rate per 100g 
first 1496 $0.1080  
next 4489 $0.1080  
next 6732 $0.1562  
next 4488 $0.2204  
over 17205 $0.3857  
Residential Class Wastewater Rates   
Monthly Service Availability Charge (includes first 1,496 
gallons) $11.4900  
Over 1,496 gallons $0.3047  
Source: 
http://www.saws.org/latest_news/water_news/docs/WaterNews201302.pdf 
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Appendix E 
DETERMINING USABLE HOUSEHOLDS THAT DO NOT PAY FOR 
WATER 
There are 18,890 households in Group 2. After we filter out 8,867 households that have 
one or more missing variables (not include AMTW), we are left with 10,023 households. 
Also, we filter out 467 households that answer 2 in METRO or 3 in TENURE and this 
leaves us with 9,556 households. Last, we filter out 371 households that reported negative 
or 0 income so the final number of households is 9,185. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
